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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature Of The Case
Crow appeals from the district court's dismissal, following an evidentiary hearing,
of his petition for post-conviction relief.

Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings
The factual background and procedural history of Crow's criminal case, as
related by Idaho Court of Appeals, are as follows:
In July 2010, officers responded to a shooting involving Crow and
his ex-girlfriend (victim). Crow and the victim dated for approximately six
years and separated around one month prior to the shooting. Crow and
the victim had a child together and, at the time, were sharing custody. On
the day of the shooting, Crow had custody of the child (at Crow's mother's
residence) and was to return the child to the victim around noon. The
victim observed Crow pull into her driveway that day. However, instead of
dropping off the child, Crow backed up and left. The victim indicated that
normally she would have been alone, but that day her mother was at her
residence. The victim later surmised Crow had seen her mother's car in
the driveway and left.
A short time thereafter, the victim drove to Crow's mother's
residence to pick up the child. When the victim arrived, Crow desired to
talk about their relationship and the victim agreed. While talking on the
front porch, the victim realized Crow had been drinking and decided to
leave. The victim attempted to open the front door to retrieve her child,
but found the door was locked and so she knocked. Because Crow was
acting aggressively, the victim dialed 911 on her cell phone but did not
send the call initially. Crow then drew a handgun from his pants and
stated to the victim, "If I can't have you, no one can." Crow also stated "I
got this for you" in a threatening manner while pointing the gun at the
victim. By this time, the front door had been unlocked by someone within
the house. The victim fled into the house and dialed 911. Crow pursued
her. Crow again pointed the gun into the victim's face and chest, and the
victim pushed the gun away. Crow fired the gun, wounding the victim in
the arm.
The victim retreated into a bathroom and locked the door. The
victim heard one or two additional shots. One of these shots went through
the bathroom door, although missing the victim. Crow subsequently
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gained entry into the bathroom. In desperation, the victim began hugging
Crow, telling him that she would come back to him. Crow loosened his
grip on the gun and the victim seized it and turned it over to Crow's sister.
Police arrived shortly thereafter.
The state charged Crow with attempted murder in the first degree,
I.C. §§ 18-4001, 18-4002, 18-4003(a), 18-4004 and 18-306; domestic
battery involving traumatic injury in the presence of children, I.C. §§ 18918(2)(a) and (b) and 18-918(4); use of a firearm in the commission of a
crime, I.C. § 19-2520; and infliction of great bodily injury, I.C. § 19-25208.
Crow agreed to plead guilty to attempted first degree murder and the state
agreed to dismiss the remaining charge and the enhancements.[ 1l The
district court imposed a unified term of fifteen years, with a minimum
period of confinement of nine years. The district court also imposed a
$5000 fine pursuant to I.C. § 19-5307. Crow subsequently filed an I.C.R.
35 motion for reduction of sentence and the district court denied the
motion.
State v. Crow, Docket 40073, 2013 Unpublished Opinion No. 809, pp.1-2 (Idaho App.,
December 31, 2013). On appeal, Crow argued that the $5,000 fine was not legal, his
sentence was excessive, and the district court erred by denying his Rule 35 motion for
leniency.

Id.

On December 31, 2013, the Idaho Court of Appeals issued an

unpublished decision affirming Crow's term of imprisonment and the denial of his Rule
35 motion, but reducing the fine to $2,500.

kL

p.6. The Remittitur was filed on January

29, 2014. (8/28/14 Tr., p.118, Ls.13-15.)

On October 30, 2015, the state filed a Motion to Augment the Appellate Record and
Statement in Support Thereof, seeking to augment the record on appeal with: (1) the
state's Motion to Amend Prosecuting Attorney's Information and attached proposed
Amended Prosecuting Attorney's Information, filed March 7, 2011; (2) the Amended
Prosecuting Attorney's Information, filed April 5, 2011; and (3) the Minute Entry for the
April 4, 2011 pre-trial conference and hearing on the State's Motion to Amend
Information (etc.), filed April 7, 2011. On November 2, 2015, this Court entered an
Order Granting Motion to Augment the Record. The augmented documents show that,
almost one year prior to Crow's guilty plea, the state unilaterally dismissed the felony
domestic battery in the presence of children charge because it would be "unduly
confusing for the jury to distinguish." (11 /2/15 Order Granting Mot. to Aug. the Record;
3/7/11 Motion to Amend Pros. Atty's. Information; 4/5/11 Amended Pros. Atty's
Information; 4/7/11 Minute Entry.)
1

2

On April 5, 2013, Crow filed a petition and affidavit for post-conviction relief, and
a supporting memorandum, presenting a variety of claims 2 based on the following
underlying allegations:
(1)

the crime he pied guilty to -- attempted first degree murder -- does
not exist in Idaho;

(2)

he was charged with two crimes that are the "same offense";

(3)

trial counsel advised him to waive his preliminary hearing because
he was facing the death penalty and because the judge would be
angry with him otherwise;

(4)

the state coerced him into pleading guilty by overcharging him with
two penalty enhancements that could not both be charged;

(5)

the firearm enhancement violated his right against double jeopardy;

(6)

trial counsel failed to appeal his civil judgment and consult with him
about filing such an appeal;

(7)

he was denied the right to testify at his Rule 35 hearing; and

(8)

trial counsel failed to inform him about a lesser included offense

(R., pp.4-23; Supp. R., p.1; 3 see 8/28/14 Tr., p.28, Ls.8-16 (Crow's testimony regarding
overcharging claim).)
After Crow was appointed counsel (Supp. R., p. 7) and the state filed an Answer
(R., pp.28-30), the district court stayed Crow's post-conviction proceeding to await the
completion of his direct appeal (Supp. R., pp.12-13). Upon completion of Crow's direct
appeal, the district court lifted the stay. (Supp. R., pp.20-21.) The district court held an

2

In addition to Crow's basic post-conviction claims, he asserted many related claims of
ineffective assistance of counsel and/or that his guilty plea was not knowingly and
intelligently entered.

3

Inasmuch as the record on appeal includes two different "Clerk's Supplemental
Record on Appeal," the state will refer to the 55-page record as "R." and the 36-page
record as "Supp. R."
3

evidentiary hearing on Crow's post-conviction claims on August 28, 2014 (see generally
8/28/14 Tr.), and heard testimony by Crow and John Souza, who was Crow's third trial
attorney and was also the attorney who had represented Crow at the time he entered
his guilty plea (8/28/14 Tr., p.80, L.24-p.81, L.1). 4 At the conclusion of the evidentiary
hearing the district court rendered a verbal decision denying all of Crow's claims.
(8/28/14 Tr., p.114, L.24 - p.141, L.15.) The district court entered a Judgment denying
Crow post-conviction relief on September 9, 2014. (R., pp.38-39.) Crow filed a timely
notice of appeal. (R., pp.40-43.)

4

In sequence, Crow was represented in his criminal case by (1) Cindy Campbell (from
initial charging through the preliminary hearing); (2) Kelly Mallard (from October 2010 to
January 2011); (3) John Souza (from January 2011 to January 2012); (4) Manuel
Murdoch - as stand-in counsel for a couple of months after Souza temporarily quit over
money issues; (5) John Souza (from March 2012 (including plea agreement and change
of plea hearing) through sentencing). (8/28/14 Tr., p.11, Ls.11-13; p.15, Ls.11-25; p.17,
Ls.9-16; p.20, L.3 - p.21, L.15; p.29, Ls.5-1 O; p.78, Ls.6-7; p.81, Ls.1-4; p.85, Ls.1-3.)
4

ISSUES
Due to the length of Issues set forth in Crow's Appellant's Brief, they are not
reproduced here. (See Appellant's Brief, p.lV.)
The state phrases the issue on appeal as:
Has Crow failed to show error in the district court's denial of his petition for postconviction relief following an evidentiary hearing?

5

ARGUMENT
Crow Has Failed To Show Error In The District Court's Denial Of His Petition For PostConviction Relief Following An Evidentiary Hearing

A

Introduction
Crow's post-conviction petition, supporting affidavit, and memorandum of law and

facts present stand-alone claims, claims that his guilty plea was not knowing and
voluntary, and claims that his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance.

(See

generally R., pp.4-23.) Regardless of how framed, Crow's claims center on allegations
that (1) he pleaded guilty to an offense that does not exist in Idaho - attempted first
degree murder; (2) Ms. Campbell, his initial trial counsel, told him he was facing the
death penalty and the judge would get angry with him if he did not waive his right to a
preliminary hearing; (3) the state coerced his guilty plea by improperly charging him with
(a) two substantive offenses based on the same conduct, (b) two penalty enhancements
for one offense, and (c) a firearm enhancement in connection with the attempted first
degree murder charge; and (4) his attorney (a) failed to consult with him about, and
appeal from, the civil judgment, (b) failed to inform him of the lesser included offense of
injuring another by discharge of aimed firearms, I.C. § 18-3306, and (c) informed Crow
he was not permitted to testify at the Rule 35 hearing. (R., pp.9-19.)
At the evidentiary hearing, Crow testified in support of most, but not all, of his
claims, and the state presented testimony by John Souza, the attorney who represented
Crow at the time Crow accepted the plea agreement and pied guilty to attempted first
degree murder. (See generally 8/28/14 Tr.) At the end of the hearing, the district court
verbally rendered a decision denying Crow's request for post-conviction relief. (8/28/14
Tr., p.118, L.22- p.141, L.15.)

6

On appeal, Crow restates the arguments he made to the district court in his
Memorandum of Law and Facts in Support of Petition for Post Conviction Relief. With a
few modifications at the beginning and the conclusion, Crow's Appellant's Brief mirrors
the body of the supporting memorandum he filed in district court. (Compare R., pp.1223 with Appellant's Brief, pp.3-13.)

For the same reasons expressed by the district

court in its verbal ruling at the end of the evidentiary hearing, and based on Crow's
failure to present any evidence on several claims, Crow has failed to show error in the
district court's denial of post-conviction relief.

B.

Standard Of Review
"Applications for post-conviction relief under the UPCPA initiate civil proceedings

in which, like a civil plaintiff, the applicant must prove his or her allegations by a
preponderance of the evidence." McKay v. State, 148 Idaho 567, 570, 225 P.3d 700,
703 (2010) (citing Hauschulz v. State, 144 Idaho 834, 838, 172 P.3d 1109, 1113 (2007);
I.C.R. 57(c)).
When the district court conducts an evidentiary hearing and enters findings of
fact and conclusions of law, an appellate court will disturb the findings of fact only if they
are clearly erroneous, but will freely review the conclusions of law drawn by the district
court from those facts. Mitchell v. State, 132 Idaho 274, 276-77, 971 P.2d 727, 729-730
(1998). A trial court's decision that a post-conviction petitioner has not met his burden
of proof is entitled to great weight. Sanders v. State, 117 Idaho 939, 940, 792 P.2d 964,
965 (Ct. App. 1990). Appellate courts will "give due deference to any implicit findings of
the trial court supported by substantial evidence." State v. Yeager, 139 Idaho 680, 684,
85 P.3d 656, 660 (2004) (citing State v. DuValt, 131 Idaho 550, 552-53, 961 P.2d 641,
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643-44 (1998); State v. Kirkwood, 111 Idaho 623, 625, 726 P.2d 735, 737 (1986)); State
v. Whiteley, 124 Idaho 261, 268, 858 P.2d 800, 807 (Ct. App. 1993) ("Where explicit
factual findings have not been made, we extrapolate the implicit findings of fact from the
record and will uphold those if they are supported by substantial, competent evidence.");
State v. Middleton, 114 Idaho 377, 380, 757 P.2d 240, 243 (Ct. App. 1988) (the
appellate court should examine the record to determine the "implicit" findings which
underlie the judge's order).
The credibility of the witnesses, the weight to be given to their testimony, and the
inferences to be drawn from the evidence are all matters solely within the province of
the district court.

Peterson v. State, 139 Idaho 95, 97, 73 P.3d 108, 110 (Ct. App.

2003).

C.

Standards Applicable To Claims Of Ineffective Assistance Of Counsel
Where the petitioner alleges entitlement to relief based upon ineffective

assistance of counsel, he must demonstrate that his attorney's performance was
objectively deficient and that he was prejudiced by that deficiency.

Strickland v.

Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-88 (1984); Aragon v. State, 114 Idaho 758, 760-61, 760
P.2d 1174, 1176-77 (1988).

To establish deficient performance, the petitioner must

"overcome the strong presumption that counsel's performance was adequate by
demonstrating 'that counsel's representation did not meet objective standards of
competence."' Vick v. State, 131 Idaho 121, 124, 952 P.2d 1257, 1260 (Ct. App. 1998)
(quoting Roman v. State, 125 Idaho 644, 648-49, 873 P.2d 898, 902-03 (Ct. App.
1994)). Appellate courts "will not second guess counsel without evidence of inadequate
preparation, ignorance of the relevant law, or other shortcomings capable of objective

8

evaluation." State v. Chapman, 120 Idaho 466, 469-470, 816 P.2d 1023, 1026-27 (Ct.
App. 1991) (citations omitted).
When the alleged deficiency involves counsel's advice in relation to a guilty plea,
"in order to satisfy the 'prejudice' requirement, the defendant must show that there is a
reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, he would not have pleaded guilty
and would have insisted on going to trial."
(footnote and citations omitted).

Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 58 (1985)

"Moreover, to obtain relief on this type of claim, a

petitioner must convince the court that a decision to reject the plea bargain would have
been rational under the circumstances." Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 372 (2010)
(citing Roe v. Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. 470 (2000)).

D.

The District Court Correctly Concluded Crow Is Not Entitled To Post-Conviction
Relief
1.

Claim That Attempted First Degree Murder Does Not Exist In Idaho

Citing State v. Wood, 125 Idaho 911, 876 P.2d 1352 (1994), Crow argues on
appeal, as he claimed and testified below, that he entered a guilty plea to a crime that
does not exist in Idaho - attempted first degree murder. (Appellant's Brief, pp.3-4; see
R., pp.5, 13-14; 8/28/14 Tr., p.24, Ls.13-17; p.56, L.4 - p.57, L.20.)

From that

underlying claim Crow argues that his trial counsel was ineffective for allowing him to
enter such a plea and that his plea was not knowingly and intelligently made.

(Id.)

Crow's arguments fail.
In Wood, the Idaho Supreme Court explained that, although attempted felony
murder is not a crime in Idaho, attempted first degree murder is:
[Wood] contends that the conviction was improperly entered for the
offense of attempted first-degree murder during the commission of a
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felony.r5l We granted Wood's request to consider this additional issue on
rehearing because we have recently held that attempted felony murder is
not a crime in Idaho. State v. Pratt, 125 Idaho 91, 873 P.2d 848 (1994). [5l
. . . . Clearly the information was intended and understood by both
the State and Wood to charge attempted premeditated murder (184003(a)), and attempted murder committed during the commission of a
felony (18-4003(d)). Wood thereafter negotiated with the State and
entered a plea of guilty to the offenses charged in the information,
attempted premeditated murder and attempted murder committed during
the commission of a felony.

. . . . Because we have held that there is no crime in Idaho for
attempted first-degree murder committed during the commission of a
felony, the plea entered by Wood to the charge is dismissed. However,
this is of no avail to Wood on his petition for rehearing. He also clearly
pied guilty to attempted premeditated and deliberate first-degree murder
under I.C. § 18-4003(a) and was sentenced for that offense. The fact that
one of the charges to which Wood pied guilty is dismissed has no effect
on the validity of his plea to the other attempted first-degree murder
charge. Therefore, the judgment of conviction and sentence for attempted
premeditated murder are affirmed.
Wood, 125 Idaho at 917, 876 P.2d at 1358 (emphasis added).
Crow apparently believes that, because he was originally charged in a second
count of the Information with felony domestic battery in the presence of children, he
must have been charged in the first count with attempted first degree murder that

5

Idaho's felony murder rule, I.C. § 18-4003(d), reads:
Any murder committed in the perpetration of, or attempt to
perpetrate, aggravated battery on a child under twelve (12) years of age,
arson, rape, robbery, burglary, kidnapping or mayhem, or an act of
terrorism, as defined in section 18-8102, Idaho Code, or the use of a
weapon of mass destruction, biological weapon or chemical weapon, is
murder of the first degree.

In Pratt, 125 Idaho 546, 558, 873 P.2d 800, 812 (1993), the Idaho Supreme Court
concluded:
6

We agree with Pratt. Attempted felony murder is not a crime in
Idaho. Instead, there is either the crime of murder, or the crime of attempt
to commit a crime ....
10

occurred "during the commission of a felony."
134, L.11; p.136, L.20 - p.139, L.5.)

kt

(See 8/28/14 Tr., p.133, L.24 - p.

As the district court informed Crow at the

evidentiary hearing, the statement in Wood that "there is no crime in Idaho for attempted
first-degree murder committed during the commission of a felony" refers to felonymurder, and Crow was not charged with attempting that crime. (8/28/14 Tr., p.126, L.10
- p.127, L.3; p.133, L.24 - p.140, L.24.) The district court further explained:
That is talking about the Felony Murder Rule. Okay? You can
commit a felony and if you commit a murder during that felony, that's what
we call felony murder. You can still commit attempted murder, but it's not
attempted felony murder. Okay? ...

In this case, Wood was - he pied guilty to attempted first-degree
murder in connection with a robbery. I don't know how to better explain it
to you. They're talking about the Felony Murder Rule. It's an attempted
murder rather than a felony murder.
So attempted murder is a lawful crime in Idaho; attempted felony
murder is not, because you actually have to commit a felony and kill
somebody. You can't attempt to commit a felony and not kill anybody and
be charged with attempted felony murder.
(8/28/14 Tr., p.139, L.9 - p.140, L.6.)

The district court correctly concluded that

attempted first degree murder is a valid charge in Idaho, and Wood did not state
anything different. 7 Therefore, Crow's claim, and associated claims, that rely on the

7

The district court correctly noted that the issue of whether attempted first degree
murder is a crime in Idaho should have been raised on direct appeal, implicitly denying
Crow's claim on that ground also. (8/28/14 Tr., p.122, Ls.10-14.) The UPCPA "is not a
substitute for nor does it affect any remedy incident to the proceedings in the trial court,
or of an appeal from the sentence or conviction." I.C. § 19-4901 (b). An "issue which
could have been raised on direct appeal, but was not, is forfeited and may not be
considered in post-conviction proceedings" except under very limited circumstances.
I.C. § 19-4901(b); see Hoffman v. State, 125 Idaho 188, 190-91, 868 P.2d 516, 518-19
(Ct. App. 1994) (refusing to consider issues that should have been raised on direct
appeal).
11

assertion that attempted first degree murder is not a crime in Idaho are meritless. Crow
has failed to show any error in the district court's denial of this claim, and the claims
dependent upon it. 8

2.

Claim That Crow Was Charged With Duplicative Crimes

Crow alleged in his post-conviction petition (via his supporting memorandum), as
he does now on appeal, that the two substantive charges he faced were the same. He
explains:
Clearly, the Petitioner has been charged with the crimes of
attempted first degree murder ... and he has also been charged with the
crime of Domestic Battery, involving traumatic injury, (In [sic] the presence
of a child) ....
The charges against the Petitioner are the same charges, both
arising out of the same criminal conduct. ....
It is clear that one of the charges are [sic] inherent in the other
charge, and would have been a lesser included offense of each other.
Clearly, counsel was ineffective for not challenging the information as
duplicative.

This Court should find that the offenses as charged are inherent
within each other.
(Appellant's Brief, pp.5-6; R., pp.15-16.)

Crow's claim was properly denied by the

district court because he failed to present any evidence to support it at the evidentiary

Moreover, the state filed an Amended Information over eleven months prior to Crow's
guilty plea, eliminating the felony domestic battery in the presence of children charge
because it would have confused a jury. (See 11/2/15 Order Granting Mot. to Augment
the Record; 3/7/11 Motion to Amend Pros. Atty's. Information; 4/5/11 Amended Pros.
Atty's Information; 4/7/11 Minute Entry.) Accepting, arguendo, Crow's argument that he
was initially charged with attempted first degree murder "during the commission of a
felony" based on his also being charged with committing felony domestic battery in the
presence of children during the same incident, the only substantive offense he faced in
the months before he pied guilty was attempted first degree murder. Therefore, Crow's
argument fails even under his own logic.
8
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hearing, it is irrelevant because the felony domestic battery charge was dismissed
almost one year before he entered his guilty plea, and he waived the claim by pleading
guilty to attempted first degree murder.
At the evidentiary hearing, Crow's attorney did not argue, nor did Crow testify
about, Crow's claim that his initial substantive charges - attempted first degree murder
and felony domestic battery in the presence of children - were duplicative.

(See

generally 8/28/14 Tr.) Further, Crow did not attempt to have his verified post-conviction
petition or supporting affidavit admitted into evidence at the evidentiary hearing. (See
generally 8/28/14 Tr.; see also

&,

p.3 (list of exhibits admitted during evidentiary

hearing).) Therefore, because Crow presented no evidence or testimony to support his
claim, the district court correctly denied him relief. As recently explained by the Idaho
Court of Appeals in Caldwell v. State, 2015 WL 4770639, *8-9 (Idaho App., Aug. 14,
2015):
A district court must "make specific findings of fact, and state
expressly its conclusions of law," but it need only do so as "relating to
each issue presented." I.C. § 19-4907(a) (emphasis added). The purpose
of this requirement is to afford an appellate court an adequate basis upon
which to review the district court's decision when a petition for postconviction relief has been denied following an evidentiary hearing. See
Davis v. State, 116 Idaho 401, 405, 775 P.2d 1243, 1247 (Ct. App. 1989);
Maxfield v. State, 108 Idaho 493, 497, 700 P.2d 115, 119 (Ct. App. 1985).
However, as suggested by the language of I.C. § 19-4907(a), failing to
present evidence in support of a properly raised post-conviction claim at
an evidentiary hearing subjects that claim to dismissal. Loveland v. State,
141 Idaho 933, 936, 120 P.3d 751, 754 (Ct. App. 2005). This remains true
even if the petitioner previously submitted supporting affidavits, such as a
See id. (holding that the
verified petition for post-conviction relief.
petitioner's verified petition did not constitute evidence unless it was
introduced into evidence at the evidentiary hearing).
In Loveland, based on the foregoing analysis, we concluded that
the district court did not err in dismissing the petitioner's claim that his trial
counsel had ignored his request to file an appeal because, at the
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evidentiary hearing, the petitioner "declined to present any evidence" to
support that claim. Id. Caldwell attempts to distinguish Loveland by
asserting that the district court addressed the petitioner's claim that his
trial counsel had failed to file an appeal, but found that he had presented
no evidence in support thereof, whereas the district court here did not
address either of Caldwell's claims at the evidentiary hearing or in its
findings of fact and conclusions of law.
We conclude that this distinction does not reveal a substantive
difference. The district court here did not address Caldwell's claim of
failure to file an appeal, but this does not affect Caldwell's failure to raise
these issues or present any evidence in support thereof at or after the
evidentiary hearing. . . . Thus, even absent acknowledgement by the
district court, Caldwell still failed to raise, much less meet his burden of
presenting admissible evidence in support of, this claim. Accordingly, its
dismissal along with the rest of Caldwell's post-conviction petition
following the evidentiary hearing was proper.
As in Caldwell and Loveland, because Crow failed to present any admissible
evidence at the evidentiary hearing, he failed to show error in the district court's denial
of his duplicative charges claim, even if the court did not address that claim. See id.
Assuming, arguendo, that Crow presented some evidence supporting his
duplicative charges claim at the evidentiary hearing, and that the district court implicitly
considered and rejected it, 9 Crow has failed to show any error in the court's denial of

9

At one point in rendering its verbal opinion, the district court stated:
You've raised that your guilty plea was unknowingly [sic] and
coerced and overly charged and intimidated.
As I've indicated, the charges were properly asserted, and as long
as they're properly asserted, they can charge all of the crimes that they
feel are appropriate.

(8/28/14 Tr., p.128, L.23 - p.129, L.4.) Although the court did not refer to Crow's
duplicative charges claim, by stating "the charges were properly asserted, and as long
as they're properly asserted, they can charge all of the crimes that they feel are
appropriate" (8/28/14 Tr., p.129, Ls.1-4), it implicitly determined that Crow's claim was
meritless. See Yeager, 139 Idaho at 684, 85 P.3d at 660; Kirkwood, 111 Idaho at 625,
726 P.2d at 737; Whiteley, 124 Idaho at 268, 858 P.2d at 807.
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that claim. As noted, over eleven months before Crow entered his guilty plea, the state
unilaterally dismissed the charge of felony domestic battery in the presence of children
because it would be "unduly confusing for the jury to distinguish."

(11/2/15 Order

Granting Mot. to Aug. the Record; 3/7/11 Motion to Amend Pros. Atty's. Information;
4/5/11 Amended Pros. Atty's Information; 4/7/11 Minute Entry.)

The court clearly

recognized that Crow's plea agreement was unrelated to the previously dismissed
domestic battery charge.

(See 8/28/14 Tr., p.117, Ls.7-13; p.127, L.25 - p.128, L.1;

p.131, Ls.2-14.) Therefore, this Court should "extrapolate the implicit findings of fact
from the record" and uphold the district court's denial of Crow's duplicative charges
claim because his guilty plea could not have been affected by a charge the state
dismissed almost one year earlier. See Whiteley, 124 Idaho at 268, 858 P.2d at 807;
Middleton, 114 Idaho at 380, 757 P.2d at 243.
Lastly, the district court correctly explained that, by entering a guilty plea, Crow
waived all non-jurisdictional defects in prior proceedings, unless he preserved an issue
for appeal by entering a conditional guilty plea. (8/28/14 Tr., p.120, L.20 - p.121, L.1 O.);
see State v. Dunlap, 123 Idaho 396, 399, 848 P.2d 454, 457 (Ct. App. 1993); State v.
Fowler, 105 Idaho 642, 643, 671 P. 2d 1105, 1106 (Ct. App. 1983). Because Crow pied
guilty to attempted first degree murder without reserving his right to appeal his initial
charges as duplicative, he waived that alleged non-jurisdictional defect.
Inasmuch as Crow's claim was unsupported by any evidence, irrelevant, and
waived, this Court should affirm the district court's implicit denial of the claim.
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(3)

Claim That Trial Counsel Advised Crow To Waive His Preliminary Hearing
Because He Was Facing The Death Penalty

Crow claimed, and testified at the evidentiary hearing, that his first attorney, Ms.
Campbell, told him he was facing the death penalty, and that her comment was the
main reason he agreed to waive his preliminary hearing. (R., pp.9, 14-15; 8/28/14 Tr.,
p.11, L.11 - p.13, L.14.) The district court assumed Crow was advised by counsel as
alleged, but denied his claim, stating:
This is a little bit different, though, however, because once he
waived the preliminary hearing, he discussed those issues with other
counsel, who substituted in place of Ms. Campbell. They took no action,
but there's no evidence, specifically, in relation to Mr. Souza, that he was
ever requested to have a new hearing. They discussed it but primarily
focused on the issue of the plea agreement and moving forward.
As has been discussed here today, when this Court discussed the
issue raised in the Guilty Plea Questionnaire on Question 15 about that
very issue, this Court felt that had been remedied by the plea agreement.
The entry of a valid plea constitutes a waiver of non-jurisdictional
defects in prior proceedings unless the same are preserved for appellate
review ....
By pleading guilty pursuant to the plea agreement, Mr. Crow, as
explained to him at the time of his change of plea and through the Guilty
Plea Advisory Form, waived that non-jurisdictional defect, and therefore,
the issue should have also been raised on appeal.
This is where post-conviction gets a little sticky, because several
issues could be raised on appeal yet still have some impact on an
attorney's effective representation.
As it applies to the preliminary hearing, the burden, then, is that Ms.
Campbell's recommendation had to fall below an objective standard of
reasonableness, and the result would have had to have been different the outcome of the case.
And this Court does not think the defendant has carried that
burden. And that's because of two things.
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Even though that - assuming that that was told to Mr. Crow, he was
at least told at the initial appearance and at his arraignment and at the
change of plea what the maximum possible penalties were. At no time
was the death penalty ever raised. And so for that basis, the petition for
the failure to raise - or waive the preliminary hearing because of that
representation of Ms. Campbell is denied.
(8/28/14 Tr., p.120, L.11-p.122, L.5.)
In sum, the district court denied Crow's claim that he waived his right to a
preliminary hearing because his attorney told him he was facing the death penalty for
the following reasons: (1) Crow signed a waiver form indicating he was not coerced into
waiving his right to a preliminary hearing (see Respondent's Exhibit C); (2) Crow
discussed the issue with Mr. Souza, his attorney at the time the plea agreement was
reached and Crow entered his guilty plea, but Crow did not request a new preliminary
hearing (see 8/28/14 Tr., p.67, L.1 - p.85, L.14); (3) by pleading guilty, Crow waived all
non-jurisdictional defects (see Respondent's Exhibit B); see also Dunlap, 123 Idaho at
399, 848 P.2d at 457; Fowler, 105 Idaho at 643, 671 P. 2d at 1106); (4) Crow was
advised of the maximum penalties at his initial appearance, arraignment, and the
change of plea hearing, 10 and "[a]t no time was the death penalty ever raised" (8/28/14
Tr., p.121, L.23- p.122, L.2).
The district court's reasons for denying Crow's claim - especially that his
eventual guilty plea to attempted first degree murder waived all prior non-jurisdictional
defects - are supported by the facts and law.

Insofar as Crow's claim asserted his

preliminary hearing counsel was ineffective for telling him he was facing the death
penalty (see R., pp.6, 9, 14-15), he was required to prove there was a reasonable

10

The state recognizes that Crow's initial appearance is the only one of the three
proceedings that occurred before Crow's preliminary hearing date.
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probability of a different outcome if he had not been told by counsel that he was facing
the death penalty. 11 See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687-688; Aragon v. State, 114 Idaho
758,761,760 P.2d 1174, 1177 (1988). Crow has not explained why, and certainly did
not present any evidence to demonstrate that, absent counsel's (presumed) deficient
performance, he not only would have opted to have a preliminary hearing, but would
have successfully also challenged a "probable cause" finding at such hearing. In light of
the fact that Crow subsequently pied guilty to attempted first degree murder under the
much higher "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard of proof, Crow's unsupported claim
that he would have prevailed at a preliminary hearing rings hollow.
Crow has failed to show any error in the district court's denial of this claim.

(4)

Claim That The State Coerced Crow Into Pleading Guilty By Overcharging
Him With Two Penalty Enhancements

In his post-conviction petition, Crow claimed -- very generally -- that his guilty
plea "was coerced by being overly charged and intimidated" (R., p.5), but he did not
explain how he was "overly charged and intimidated." In his supporting affidavit, Crow
repeated his vaguely-worded claim, stating, "I believe that I have been overly charged
and that because of this, I became scared and entered into a plea to a charge that does
not even exist in the State of Idaho." (R., pp.9-10.) In his supporting memorandum,
Crow expounded on his claim a bit further, stating, "the use of a weapon as was
charged herein, was charged in the information as the ways or the means to have
committed the charged [sic], and to have imposed an extended term for the use of a

11

Moreover, Crow has failed to explain why his (alleged) belief that he was facing the
death penalty caused him to waive his right to a preliminary hearing. It seems much
more likely that a person facing such severe penalty would contest the state at every
turn, if only to preview the state's evidence and witnesses.
18

weapon, when the same weapon was charged as the ways or the means to have
committed the offense, violates double jeopardy." (R., pp.16-17.) Accordingly, Crow's
claim that he was overly charged and intimidated was based upon his assertion that the
firearm enhancement, in combination with the charge of attempted first degree murder,
violated principles of double jeopardy.
!However, at the evidentiary hearing, Crow did not present any testimony,
evidence, or argument to support his claim that the filing of the firearm enhancement
placed him in double jeopardy, and (presumably) for that reason, the court did not rule
on that particular claim, implicitly denying it for lack of proof. 12 (See generally 8/28/14

12

When he testified, Crow asked to read two statements he had prepared. (8/28/14
Tr., p.30, L.23 - p.31, L.12.) The court said the statements were appropriate for closing
argument and did not allow Crow to read them during the evidentiary phase of the
hearing. (8/28/14 Tr., p.32, Ls.9-22.) During closing argument, the court admitted both
documents into evidence as argument. (8/28/14 Tr., p.98, L.22 - p.100, L.19.) Crow's
counsel acknowledged the first document (Plaintiff's Exhibit 1) was information from Mr.
Crow, and the second document (Plaintiff's Exhibit 2) was "what [Crow] wanted to read
from the witness stand, but it does contain more legal argument than facts." (8/28/14
Tr., p., 99, L.3 - p.100, L.7.) Crow's exhibits presented two new arguments: (1) the
firearm enhancement could not be applied to an attempt crime, and (2) the state
improperly charged him with two enhancements for one felony. (See generally,
Plaintiff's Exhibits 1, 2); see also I.C. §§ 19-2520, 19-25208, 19-2520E.
Treating Crow's new arguments like claims, the court correctly denied them,
concluding the firearm enhancement applies to attempt crimes, and (2) the state was
entitled to file two enhancements against Crow in relation to the charge of attempted
first degree murder -- as long as Crow was not sentenced for two or more
enhancements. (8/28/14 Tr., p.122, L.16 - p.126, L.9; p.127, L.4 - p.128, L.18.)
On appeal, Crow repeats the arguments made in his Memorandum of Law and
Facts in Support of Petition for Post Conviction Relief -- he does not challenge the
court's decisions in regard to the arguments presented in the exhibits admitted during
closing argument at the evidentiary hearing. (See generally Appellant's Brief.) In any
event, the court's reasons for denying Crow's two closing arguments are correct. (See
8/28/14 Tr., p.122, L.16 - p.126, L.9; p.127, L.4 - p.128, L.18.)
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Tr.; Plaintiff's Exhibits 1, 2); Yeager, 139 Idaho at 684, 85 P.3d at 660; Whiteley, 124
Idaho at 268, 858 P.2d at 807.
Inasmuch as Crow failed to support his double jeopardy claim (re: the firearm
enhancement) with any evidence or argument at the evidentiary hearing, he has failed
to show any error in the district court's implicit denial of that claim. See Loveland, 141
Idaho at 936, 120 P.3d at 754; Caldwell, 2015 WL 4770639 at *8-9.

(5)

Claim That Trial Counsel Failed To Appeal His Civil Judgment And
Consult With Him About Filing Such An Appeal

In his post-conviction petition, Crow claimed that his attorney provided ineffective
assistance by failing to "file an appeal from the Civil [sic] judgment entered in this case.
(Which violates Double Jeopardy)." (R., p.6.) At the end of the evidentiary hearing, the
district court denied Crow's claim, explaining:
You raised the issue that you did not file an appeal from the civil
judgment in this case, which violates double jeopardy. That issue is moot
because there was an appeal.
This Court acknowledges that it misapplied 19-5307 when it
imposed that additional civil penalty. And, quite frankly, if I had been
advised of that earlier, I could have saved that issue for appeal because it
was not proper. I acknowledge that mistake, but that's been cured on
appeal.
(8/28/14 Tr., p.129, Ls.15-24.)
Despite the district court's explanation, on appeal, Crow maintains his argument
that "Counsel for the Petitioner did not file an appeal from the Civil Judgment entered
against the Petitioner in this matter, under case number CR-2010-5971 [,]" and that
"Counsel for the Petitioner did not ever confer with him to ascertain as to whether or not
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the Petitioner wanted to file an appeal of the Civil judgment entered in this case."
(Appellant's Brief, pp.7-8.)
Crow's argument is completely belied by the record, which shows that he not
only filed a direct appeal, but in that appeal, he successfully challenged the legality of
the $5,000 fine that was imposed, getting it reduced to $2,500.

See Crow, Docket

40073, 2013 Unpublished Opinion No. 809, p.6. Because Crow's claim is based on a
completely inaccurate factual basis, he has shown no error in the district court's denial
of his claim.

(6)

Other Issues Waived By Crow's Failure To Support Them With Evidence

Crow contends on appeal, as he did in his memorandum supporting his postconviction petition in district court, that his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance
by (1) advising him that he could not testify or give evidence at the hearing on his Rule
35 motion for leniency (Appellant's Brief, pp.9-1 O; see R., p.6); (2) failing to inform him
of the lesser included and "commanding" statute of I.C. § 18-3306, injuring another by
discharge of aimed firearms (Appellant's Brief, pp.10-13; see R., pp.20-23); 13 and (3)
advising him that he "needed to waive [his] preliminary hearing, because if [he] did not
do so, it would make the judge mad and he would rule against [him] during Trial [sic]"
(Appellant's Brief, Exhibit B; see R., p.9).
Although Crow presented the above-described "claims" to the district court (in his
petition, supporting affidavit, and/or supporting memorandum) and repeats them on

13

Crow also argues that the prosecutor violated his due process rights by failing to
"follow the mandatory commands of 18-3306" by not charging him with that
misdemeanor instead of attempted first degree murder. (Appellant's Brief, pp.10-13.)
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appeal, he failed to present any testimony or evidence to support them at the
evidentiary hearing. 14

(See generally 8/28/14 Tr.)

As a result, under Caldwell and

Loveland, Crow has waived those claims and they should be dismissed. See Caldwell,
2015 WL4770639 at *8-9; Loveland, 141 Idaho at 936, 120 P.3d at 754.
The district court commented on the lack of merit in Crow's claim that his
attorney advised him that he was not entitled to testify at the Rule 35 hearing, stating:
This Court is not required to even allow argument. Arguments were
made at the Rule 35 hearing. This Court does not take testimony,
evidence set for a Rule 35. If there's any new evidence, it's presented
through affidavit form.
(8/28/14 Tr., p.130, Ls.1-5.)

Indeed, I.C.R. 35(b) states that motions to correct or

modify sentences "shall be considered and determined by the court without the
admission of additional testimony and without oral argument, unless otherwise ordered
by the court .... "

Even if considered on appeal, Crow has failed to show any error in

the district court's denial of this claim.
Next, Crow's argument in regard to I.C. § 18-3306 is two-fold. First, he asserts
the prosecutor was obligated to charge him with violating I.C. § 18-3306 (injuring
another by discharge of aimed firearms) instead of attempted first degree murder, which
Crow contends is a crime that does not exist in Idaho. (Appellant's Brief, pp.10-13.)
Crow's argument is based on the mistaken notion that attempted first degree murder is
not a crime in Idaho. As previously discussed, see § D.1, supra, Crow misconstrues
language in Wood that states there is no such crime as attempted felony-murder in

14

In regard to Crow's claim that he was incorrectly advised by counsel about his right
to testify at the Rule 35 hearing, the district court noted that Crow had "not argued here
today or presented any evidence regarding your Rule 35 hearing." (8/28/14 Tr., p.129,
L.25-p.130, L.1.)
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Idaho.

Wood, 125 Idaho at 917, 876 P.2d at 1358.

Instead, Crow argues that the

charge of attempted first degree murder cannot be brought if that offense occurred
during the commission of one or more charged felonies.

For the same reasons and

analysis previously presented, see § D.1, supra, Crow's argument is fatally flawed by
his misreading of Wood; therefore, the district court's implicit denial of this claim, even if
considered on appeal, should be upheld. See Yeager, 139 Idaho at 684, 85 P.3d at
660; Whiteley, 124 Idaho at 268, 858 P.2d at 807.
In a related claim, Crow argues that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to
inform him that the crime of injuring another by discharge of aimed firearms (I.C. § 183306) is a lesser included offense to attempted first degree murder, and that his guilty
plea was not entered "knowingly and voluntarily." (Appellant's Brief, p.11; see R., p.21.)
However, Crow failed to allege, much less provide evidence showing that, under the
prejudice prong of Strickland, "there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's
(alleged) errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to
trial." Hill, 474 U.S. at 58. Further, Crow failed to allege and prove that "a decision to
reject the plea bargain would have been rational under the circumstances." Padilla, 559
U.S. at 372 (citing Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. 470). Crow has failed to show error in the
implicit denial of this claim.
Finally, Crow argues that he waived his preliminary hearing, in part, because his
trial counsel advised him that, if he did not do so, the judge would get angry and rule
against him during trial. (See Appellant's Brief, p.13 (referring to "the attached sworn
affidavit of the Petitioner, (Which was used in the Post Conviction case)").) As stated,
because he presented no evidence or testimony on this claim during the evidentiary
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hearing, Crow failed to support his claim with any facts that would warrant relief - i.e., a
showing of deficient performance and prejudice under Strickland. See Caldwell, 2015
WL 4770639 at *8-9; Loveland, 141 Idaho at 936, 120 P.3d at 754. Crow has failed to
show any error in the district court's implicit denial of this claim.

CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm the district court's judgment
denying Crow's petition for post-conviction relief.
DATED this 8th day of December, 2015.
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